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these factors against the cost and inconvenience the landowner would incur

in remedying the situation.7 2 The issue would be whether the landowner

acted in a reasonably prudent manner in view of the likelihood of foreseeable
harm. Although the technical status of the entrant is a factor to be considered in determining liability-it should not be conclusive.

There is no valid reason why the court should not adopt a uniform
standard of due care.

The common law distinctions are at best an antiquity,

at worse an indication of a failure within the system.7 3 Perhaps it is
summed up best in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished74 long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.

A. Chris Heinrichs.

TAX LIENS-Bankruptcy-Perfection Of A
California Tax Lien
In re Perry,-

F.2d

-

(9th Cir. 1973).

The bankrupt, Mr. Perry, incurred a California personal income tax liability for 1962 which was never satisfied. The California Franchise Tax
Board (FTB) recorded a certificate of tax delinquency with the county
(2) the express making of a communication to him of the condition;
(3) the reputation in the neighborhood on the subject; and
(4) the intrinsic quality of the occurrence.
2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 245, at 42-43 (3d ed. 1940).
72. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968) enumerates some of the
factors to be considered in determining a landowner's liability. They include the closeness of the connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and
the prevalence and availability of insurance.
73. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1972), emphasizes the adaptibility of the common law:
It is the genius of the common law that it recognizes changes in our social, economic, and moral life. Legal classifications such as trespasser and licensee are judicial creations which should be cast aside when they are no longer useful as controlling tools for the jury. The principle of stare decisis was not meant to keep
a stranglehold on developments which are responsive to our new values, experiences, and circumstances. In our opinion, the time has come to put an end to
our total reliance on these common law labels and to allow the finder of fact to
focus on whether the landowner has exercised "reasonable care under all circumstances."
74. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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recorder on December 15, 1966.1 Some 2 2 months later, a petition in
bankruptcy was filed which identified the bankrupt's remaining estate as
consisting solely of personal property.

The FTB had not effected an exe-

cution on Mr. Perry's property prior to bankruptcy.

Section 18882 of the

California Revenue and Taxation Code provides for the creation, upon the

recording of a tax certificate, of a lien upon "all property" of the taxpayer
in the county where recorded, which lien has the "force, effect, and priority
of a judgment lien."'2 The referee in bankruptcy held that such a lien
attached only to real property of the taxpayer, and that the FTB had no

tax lien against the bankrupt's personal property. 3 The district court summarily affirmed the referee's decision and the FTB appealed. Held-Affirmed on other grounds. Section 18882 of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code provides for a lien that binds both real and personal property
of the delinquent taxpayer; this lien, however, is not perfected or enforce-

able against a bona fide purchaser of personal property without execution4
and levy, and therefore will be invalid against the trustee in bankruptcy.
Distribution of a bankrupt's estate among creditors is governed ultimately

by the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 5 While secured claims are generally entitled to satisfaction before the claims of unsecured creditors, the Bankruptcy Act postpones the payment of valid tax liens on personal property
that are not accompanied by possession until there has been complete payment of certain administrative expenses and wage claims.6 Unsecured tax
1. The FTB was acting in accordance with CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 18881
(Deering 1958) which provided:
If any tax, interest, or penalty imposed under this part is not paid when due,
the Franchise Tax Board may file in the office of any county recorder a certificate specifying the amount of the tax, interest, and penalty due, the name and last
known address of the taxpayer liable for the amount, and the fact that the Franchise Tax Board has complied with all provisions of this part in the computation
and levy of the tax.
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18882 (Deering 1958) provided:
From the time of the filing for recording the amount of the tax, interest, and
penalty set forth constitutes a lien upon all property of the taxpayer in the county,
owned by him or afterward and before the lien expires acquired by him. The
lien has the force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien and continues for 10
years from the date of the recording unless sooner released or otherwise discharged.
These statutes have since been amended as indicated in CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §H
18881-82 (Deering Supp. 1972). These changes, however, are not material to the
issues of the instant case.
2. CAL REV. & TAx. CODE § 18882 (Deering Supp. 1972).
3. In re Perry, - F.2d -,(9th Cir. 1973).
4. Id. at -.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1 to 1255 (1970).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 107c(3) (1970) provides in part:
Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession shall be
postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
(a) of section 104 of this title . ...
II U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970) provides in part:
(a) The debts to have priority . . .and the order of payment, shall be (1) the
costs and expenses of administration . . . (2) wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months before
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claims not released by a discharge in bankruptcy are also entitled to priority
over other claims, but are further subordinated to costs incurred by creditors

7
in successful opposition to acts in contravention of the Bankruptcy Act.
A discharge s releases the bankrupt from tax claims incurred more than
3 years prior to bankruptcy, unless secured by a valid lien. 9 To have a tax
lien valid against the trustee in bankruptcy, and entitled to the priority of a
secured creditor, the lien must have been perfected or enforceable against
one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser on the date of bankruptcy,
whether or not such a purchaser actually exists. 10 Whether or not a given
state tax lien is sufficiently perfected against a bona fide purchaser depends
upon the requirements of applicable state law."

A judgment lien is generally understood to constitute a legal claim or
charge on property of the judgment debtor as security for the payment of

the debt or obligation created by the rendition of a valid judgment. 12 At
common law judgments were not liens. 13 Judgment liens initially arose from
the right granted by early statutes to subject property to seizure and sale
on an execution.' 4 Today almost every state has enacted statutes giving
lien status to a judgment. 15 Since judgment liens are creatures of statute,
the procedure required to perfect a judgment lien as against bona fide pur-

chasers varies from state to state. The majority, including California, 1 6 require some form of recording of the judgment to perfect it so as to make
the date of commencement of the proceeding . . . (3) where the confirmation of
an arrangement or wage earner plan or the bankrupt's discharge has been refused
... upon the objection .

.

. and at the cost and expense of one or more cred-

itors . .. (4) taxes which have become legally due and owing by the bankrupt
to the United States or to any State or subdivision thereof which are not released

by a discharge in bankruptcy ...

and (5) debts other than for taxes ....

7. 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1970).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1970) defines discharge: "'Discharge' shall mean the
release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except
such as are excepted by this title."
9. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(1) (1970).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 107c(1)(B) (1970). The Bankruptcy Act defines bona fide purchaser to include "a bona fide encumbrancer or pledgee and the transferee, immediate
or mediate, of any of them." 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1970).
11. General Motors Accpt. Corp. v. Smith, 377 F.2d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 1967);
see 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 67.20, at 237-39 (14th ed. 1971).
12. See Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 760, 767 (1849); Shirk v.
Thomas, 22 N.E. 976, 977 (Ind. 1889); Jones v. Hall, 15 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Va. 1941);
46 AM. Jum. 2d Judgments § 239 (1969).
13. Baker v. Morton, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 150, 158 (1870); Taylor v. McGrew,
64 N.E. 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 1902); Jones v. Hall, 15 S.E.2d 108, 109 (Va. 1941);
46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 238 (1969).
14. Coombs v. Jordan, 37 Md. Rep. (3 Bland. Ch.) 284, 298 (1831); Jones v. Hall,
15 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Va. 1941); 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 238 (1969).
15. Only Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont do not provide for statutory judgment liens.
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (Deering 1973); Yager v. Yager, 60 P.2d 422,
424 (Cal. 1936).
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it a matter of public record. 17 By recording, constructive notice is given to
all purchasers of the existence of a lien against the judgment debtor in the
county where it is recorded.' 8
While recording is generally sufficient to perfect a lien against real property, personalty poses a different problem. Since personal property is by its
very nature transitory, to allow perfection of a lien on such property by
mere recording would impose an impossible burden on purchasers to check
the records of every county in the state for liens against the owner, and furthermore for liens against every predecessor in title. Because of this impracticality, most states restrict the effect of judgment liens to real property.' 9 For example, California makes a judgment a lien "upon all the real
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution," in the county
20
where an abstract of the judgment is recorded.
At common law, personal property of a judgment debtor was subjected
to a lien based, not upon the judgment itself, but upon the execution of
that judgment. 21 The judgment creditor obtained a lien of execution by a
writ of fieri facias which directed the sheriff to seize and sell the debtor's
personal property in satisfaction of the debt. 22 An execution
lien then
23
commenced at the time of the issuance of this writ to the sheriff.
Most states have statutorily adopted exeuction procedures similar to the
common law enforcement of judgments. Most of these statutes, including
California's, 24 provide for execution liens binding upon both real and personal property.2 5 These statutes differ, however, as to when such a lien
arises. In many states an execution lien commences upon delivery of the
writ to the sheriff or other officer authorized to execute it;2 6 other states, as
17. E.g.,

ALA. CODE

tit. 7, §§ 584-85 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-1-45-2 (1973);
§§ 1554-55 (1942); PA. STAT.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 20 (1973); Miss. CODE ANN.

tit. 12, § 878 (1953).
18. South v. Wishard, 303 P.2d 805, 812 (CaL Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Stout v. Gill,
294 P. 446, 448 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
19. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-1-45-2 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 20
(1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 878 (1953). But see ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 58485 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 110-507 (1935); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1554-55 (1942).
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (Deering 1973).
21. See Rock Island Plow Co. v. Reardon, 222 U.S. 354, 363 (1912); Coombs v.
Jordan, 37 Md. Rep. (3 Bland, Ch.) 284, 300 (1831); 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments
§ 249 (1969).
22. Coombs v. Jordan, 37 Md. Rep. (3 Bland. Ch.) 284, 315 (1831); 30 AM. JUR.
ANN.

2d Executions § 28 (1967).

23. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Reardon, 222 U.S. 534, 363 (1912); 33 C.J.S. Executions § 124 (1942).
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 688 (Deering 1973).
25. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 521 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-1-34-9, 34-145-5 (1973); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6012 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2311,
2381 (1967). See 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments §§ 246, 249 (1969).
26. E.g., Rothchild v. State, 165 N.E. 60 (Ind. 1929); Harris v. Max Kohner,
Inc., 187 A.2d 97, 99 (Md. Ct. App. 1963); Commonwealth v. Lombardo, 52 A.2d
657, 659 (Pa. 1947); see 33 C.J.S. Executions § 124 (1942).
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in California, 27 require actual levy before an exeuction lien is perfected.2 8
The levy of an execution refers to the actual seizure or appropriation of
29
property by the sheriff for the purpose of satisfying the writ.
Consequently, California follows the general rule that personal property
of a judgment debtor is subject to a lien based upon an execution,3 0 but not
upon rendition of judgment Al This position was affirmed in Miller v. Bank
of America3 2 wherein the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that for a judgment creditor to obtain a lien on personal property under a
judgment, it is necessary that a writ of execution issued on the judgment
33
be levied on the property.
Section 18882 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, which was
involved in the instant case, provides that the recording of a certificate of
income tax delinquency by the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) creates a lien on "all property of the taxpayer in the county," which lien has
the "force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien."'3 4 The majority in
Perry determined with little dispute that a lien on "all property" includes both
real and personal.33 Given then that a section 18882 tax lien attaches to
both real and personal property, how is such a lien with the "force, effect,
and priority of a judgment lien" perfected as to a taxpayer's personalty?
The California Court of Appeals for the Third District in Wayland v.
as
State36 interpreted the meaning of the phrase "force, effect, and priority"
37
used in Section 1703 of the California Unemployment Insurance Code:
The term "force and effect" is of common, everyday usage. Certainly, then, such words must be read in their common, accepted meanthe force and effect of something
ing; that is, by giving to something
38
else is to give equality to each.
In Wayland, the state had acquired a lien for delinquent contributions on
certain real property of an employer pursuant to section 1703. The prop27. Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1948); Summerville

v. Stockton Milling Co., 76 P. 243, 246 (Cal. 1904).

28. E.g., McKay v. Trusco Fin.. Co., 198 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1952); Tallulah
Fin. Co. v. Matthews, 116 So. 2d 121, 123 (La. Ct. App. 1959). See 33 C.J.S. Executions § 124 (1942).

29. Dutertre v. Driard, 7 Cal. 549, 551 (1857); Bent v. H.W. Weaver, Inc., 145

S.E. 594, 595 (W. Va. 1928).
30. CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 688 (Deering 1973).

* 31. Id. § 674.

32. Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948).
33. Id. at 419, following Summerville v. Stockton Milling Co., 76 P. 243, 246 (Cal.
1904) (holding an estate for years to be personal property and to require levy of
execution to perfect a lien thereon).
34. CAL. REv. &TAx. CODE § 18882 (Deering Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
35. In re Perry, - F.2d -, - (9th Cir. 1973)..
36. 326 P.2d 954 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
37. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1703 (Deering Supp. 1973).
38. Wayland v. State, 326 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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erty was subsequently sold to the plaintiffs under a power of sale contained
-in a deed of trust on the property. In holding that the state's lien was extinguished by sale of the property under the power of sale in the deed of
trust, the court held that a section 1703 lien with the "force, effect, and
priority of a judgment lien" was identical in all respects to a judgment lien,
and as such could be reached by a sale under a power.3 9
The majority in Perry similarly interpreted Section 18882 of the California
Revenue and Taxation Code. 40 Although not expressly relied upon, the decision followed Wayland by holding that a section 18882 tax lien with the
"force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien" was identical to a lien of
judgment. Hence, by recording a tax certificate, the FTB perfected a lien
on the taxpayer's real property. Because in California the levy of a writ of
execution is necessary to bind personal property under a judgment, 41 likewise
levy of execution was required for the FTB to perfect its lien on the tax42
payer's personalty.
In the instant case Judge Zirpoli's dissent argued that Section 18882 of
the California Revenue and Taxation Code defines the scope of the lien by
attaching it to "all property of the taxpayer in the county" and hence is
broader than the ordinary judgment lien, which in California binds only real
property. 43 Accordingly, the phrase "force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien" does not limit the lien's scope but merely defines its characteristics. Since one characteristic of a judgment lien is its perfection by recording, a section 18882 lien on both real and personal property, in Judge
Zirpoli's view, is likewise perfected by recording, and levy of execution is not
44
necessary.
There is validity to this theory. California judgment and execution liens
are separate and distinct. 45 The judgment lien is dependent upon the rendition of judgment, binds only real property, and once perfected by recording is valid for 10 years; 46 the execution lieif, valid for only one year, binds
both real and personal property, and is dependent not upon the judgment
itself but upon enforcement of the judgment by execution and levy. 47 Since
39.

Id. at 956.

The decision in Wayland was additionally justified under the pre-

sumption that the legislature created the tax lien with full knowledge of the consequences of its action. In light of this presumption, it was inconceivable that the legislature, fully aware of the use of trust deeds in property financing, would enact legislation with the intent of declaring commonly accepted statutory procedures invalid as

against a tax lien.

Hence, the court rejected such a change in the absence of more

affirmative legislation.
40. In re Perry, 41. Miller v. Bank
42. In re Perry, -

Id. at 956.
F.2d -, - (9th Cir. 1973).
of America, 166 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1948).
F.2d -, - (9th Cir. 1973).

43. Id. at -.
This issue was raised but never dealt with in Schribner v. Alameda
County-East Bay Title Ins. Co., 320 P.2d 82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
44. In re Perry, -

F.2d -,

-

(9th Cir. 1973).

45. Lean v. Givens, 81 P. 128 (Cal. 1905).
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (Deering 1973).
47. Id. § 688.
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a section 18882 tax lien binds both real and personal property, there is
little doubt that it is distinguishable from the ordinary judgment lien, and
therefore might be perfected differently.
Other jurisdictions, in construing statutes substantially similar to section
18882, have reached divergent conclusions. 48 For example, in Pennsylvania a judgment lien commonly binds only real property; 49 execution is
necessary to bind personalty.50 Section 308.1 of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Insurance Law51 provides for a lien in favor of the commonwealth, by recording, on both real and personal property of the employer
who is delinquent in payment of his unemployment compensation fund contributions.5 2 The statute further provides that the commonwealth can have
copies of the lien recorded "upon which record it shall be lawful for writs of
scire facias to issue and be prosecuted to judgment and execution in the
same manner as such writs are ordinarily employed." 5 3 In Commonwealth
v. Lombardo5 4 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the commonwealth's lien under section 308.1 did not bind personal property of a delinquent employer which he had transferred to an innocent third party before
the commonwealth had issued its writ of fieri facias or execution. 55 It was
reasoned that to accept the commonwealth's contention that section 308.1
provided for a lien on personal property by mere recording, if followed to
its logical conclusion, would result in a complete disruption of the Pennsylvania law of sales of personal property; no one would be assured of good
title to any personal property purchased from an employer without proof
of the employer's compliance with the Unemployment Compensation Law. 6
If the legislature wished to place such a restriction on the alienation of personal property, language should have been used to express such a purpose
57
clearly and unequivocally.
48. E.g., In re Ever Krisp Food Prods. Co., 11 N.W.2d 852, 857 (Mich. 1943)
held that the Michigan personal property tax lien on "all personal property" was perfected upon assessment, and that property could be distrained although found in the
hands of a subsequent bona fide purchaser. But cf. Voight v. Ludlow Typograph Co.,
12 N.E.2d 499, 501 (Ind. 1938) which held that taxes are not a lien on personal
property until levy. See also State v. Woodroof, 46 So. 2d 553 (Ala. 1950) and
United States v. Bradley, 321 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1963), Alabama and Mississippi cases
respectively, which held tax liens on personal property to be perfected by recording.
But it must also be noted that in Alabama and Mississippi, ordinary judgment liens
also bind personal property by recording. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 584-85 (1960); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 1554-55 (1942).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 861 (1953).
50. In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 308.1 (1964).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 308.1.
Id. § 308.1.
52 A.2d 657 (Pa. 1947).
Id. at 662.
56. Id. at 660.
57. Id. at 659-60.
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The rationale of Lombardo parallels the established presumption of California courts that the legislature, in enacting a statute, does not intend to
overthrow long-established principles of law, unless such an intention clearly
appears, either by express provision or necessary implication. s Instead, it
is the policy of California courts to presume that the legislature took such
principles for granted rather than sought to alter them in omitting a specific
provision from their application and that where uncertainty exists, consideration may be given to consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. 9
There are other California statutes providing for liens on personal property
which, like Section 18882 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code,
are given the "force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien;" 0 but they contain additional clauses exempting bona fide purchasers of personal property
from the effect of those liens. 61 For example, Section 1703 of the California
Unemploymdnt Insurance Code provides that the state's recording of a certificate of delinquent unemployment insurance contributions of an employer
"constitutes a lien upon all the property in the county" where it is recorded
with "the force, effect, and priority of a judgment lien," but such lien
"shall not be valid insofar as personal property is concerned as against a
62
purchaser for value without actual notice of the lien."
The absence of such a bona fide purchaser exemption clause in Section
18882 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code is of disputed significance. The majority in Perry attached little importance to the omission of
the clause, reasoning that its absence was entirely consistent with its decision
that a section 18882 lien on personal property is perfected only by levy of
execution. 63 On the other hand, Judge Zirpoli in his dissent relied heavily
on the uniform use of the provisions in other lien statutes as reflecting a
legislative intention that without such provisions, the liens would be valid
against bona fide purchasers of personalty.( 4 As a corollary, he asserted
that the noticeable absence of such a proviso in section 18882 may be indicative of a legislative intention to create a lien for income taxes by mere
recording that is perfected as against bona fide purchasers of both real and
65
personal property.
58. Wayland v. State, 326 P.2d 954,
Angeles County v. Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526,
Rptr. 49, 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
59. Garvey v. Byram, 115 P.2d 501,
Cal. Rptr. 49, 55-56 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
60. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6757,
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1703 (Deering Supp.

956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); accord, Los
532 (Cal. 1942); Jaynes v. Stockton, 14 Cal.
502-03 (Cal. 1941); Jaynes v. Stockton, 14
6757.5, 18882.5 (Deering Supp. 1973);
1973) and § 1703.5 (Deering 1971).

CAL.

61. See statutes cited note 60 supra.
62. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1703 (Deering Supp. 1973).
63. In re Perry, - F.2d -, - (9th Cir. 1973).
64. Id. at-.
65. Id. at -.
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The Maryland Court of Appeals in Liquor Dealers Credit Control, Inc.
v. Comptroller of the Treasury66 interpreted legislative intention in the use
of a similar bona fide purchaser exemption clause in a Maryland tax lien
statute. Maryland, like California, requires execution to perfect a lien on a
judgment debtor's personal property. 67 Article 81, Section 342(b) of the
Maryland Code authorized the state to file notice of due sales taxes which
would create a lien on both real and personal property of the taxpayer with
the "full force and effect of a lien of judgment."' 68 By amendment the Maryland Legislature later added to this tax lien statute a proviso that "[a]ny such
lien on personal property shall not be effective as against an innocent purchaser for value unless the personal property has been levied upon ... -69
In interpreting section 342(b) as amended, the court in Liquor Dealers felt
that there was no reason to have subsequently added this proviso protecting
bona fide purchasers if the legislature had intended that execution was
necessary in order to perfect the tax lien. The court held that "giving the
lien the 'full force and effect of a lien of judgment' had the effect, not of
requiring the lien creditor to issue an execution in order to perfect its tax
lien, but of giving the lien entered on the judgment docket the same force
and effect as the lien of a judgment on which an execution had been issued."' 70 Accordingly, the tax lien on personal property was perfected by
mere recording.
Judge Zirpoli's dissent in the instant case, interpreting legislative intent,
is substantially the same as the Liquor Dealers case. The two cases, however, are readily distinguishable. In Liquor Dealers, the task of ascertaining
legislative intent in passing on a similar statute was simplified in that such
intent could be determined on the basis of an affirmative act-the addition
of a bona fide purchaser exemption proviso to the statute. In the instant
case, however, the dissent attempted to make this determination on the basis
of an omission of such a clause. The conclusion on the basis of such an
omission, that the California Legislature intended a section 18882 tax lien on
personal property to be perfected by mere recording, is more tenuous. Such
a conclusion is contrary to established California law. 71 As stated in Wayland v. State,7 2 absent a clear and positive assertion to the contrary, the
court should not presume that the legislature intended to alter clearly established principles of law. 73 Because no apparent reason existed for pro66. 217 A.2d 571 (Md. Ct. App. 1966).
67. Prentiss Tool & Supply Co. v. Whitman & Barnes Mfg. Co., 41 A. 49, 50 (Md.
Ct. App. 1898).
68. MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, § 342(b) (1969).
69. Id. § 342(b).
70. 217 A.2d 571, 574 (Md. Ct. App. 1966).
71. Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1948); Summerville
v. Stockton Milling Co., 76 P. 243, 246 (Cal. 1904).
72. 326 P.2d 954 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
73. Id. at 956.
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viding an exception to these principles only in the case of income tax liens,
it may be more reasonable to presume that the omission was merely a legislative oversight. It is a California rule of interpretation that inconsistent
statutory provisions on the same subject will not be presumed.7 4 Rather
every statute is "construed with reference to the whole system of law of
which it is a part so that all may be harmonized" to have effect. 75 Following these rules of interpretation, the majority in Perry harmonized section
76
18882 with other similar California statutes.
Although never really expressed in Perry, perhaps the overriding reason
77
for the majority's decision is sound policy reflective of Wayland v. State
and Commonwealth v. Lombardo.7s Indeed statutes should be interpreted
in light of conceived legislative intention, 79 but what purpose could the legislature have had if in fact the bona fide purchaser exemption proviso was
intentionally omitted from section 18882? It must be presumed that the
legislature created section 18882 with full knowledge of the consequences
of its action.80 The legislature was surely aware of the firmly established
California rule that execution and levy is necessary to perfect a lien on
personal property. 8 ' The legislature must have been cognizant of the individual's necessary dependence on this rule of law. To abrogate this principle as to an income tax lien could eventually result in a complete disruption of California personal property law.82 While the legislature has the authority to establish such a change in statutory law, it must do so affirmatively
and unequivocally. In the absence of a more definite indication of legislative intent, a construction that would only lend itself to confusion in the
commercial world should be avoided.8 3
Lewis D. Wall
74. Ex parte Haines, 234 P. 883, 886 (Cal. 1925).
75. Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 249 P.2d 241, 245-47 (Cal. 1952).
76. See statutes cited note 60 supra.
77. 326 P.2d 954 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
78. 52 A.2d 657 (Pa. 1947).
79. McGaffey v. Sudowitz, 10 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Dist Ct. App. 1961).
80. Wayland v. State, 326 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Commonwealth
v. Lombardo, 52 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1947).
81. Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1948).
82. Wayland v. State, 326 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Commonwealth
v. Lombardo, 52 A.2d 657, 659-60 (Pa. 1947).
83. Wayland v. State, 326 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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